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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
SOUTH EAST FURNITURE
COMPANY, a corporation of
of Utah,
Plaintiff,

vs.
No. 6297

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, operating as the UTAH LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD,
Defendant.

PLANTIFF'S BRIEF.
I

'·•'•!

•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding is brought by the plaintiff, under
Chapter 55, Section ll(f), Laws of Utah, 1937, for the
purpose of reviewing a decision and order of the Industrial Commission of Utah, operating as the Utah
Labor Relations Board, in the matter of certification of
employes of the South East Furniture Company, for the
purpose of collective bargaining, which decision and
order, made and entered by the said Board on the 16th
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

day of August, 1940, certified that United Industrial
Local Union No. 1068 .was authorized and appointed by
'a majority of the employes engaged and employed in
the department theretofore determined by the said
Board as the appropriate unit for collective bargaining
purposes with the South East Furniture Comany, the
plaintiff herein, and ordered and directed the plaintiff,
without further delay, to enter into negotiations for the
purpose of collective bargaining with the said local union,
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ·ment, or other conditions of employment.
On or a bout July 26, 1940, the said union notified
the plaintiff that it represented a majority of a certain
group of employes of the plaintiff, and demanded to bargain collectively with the plaintiff in behalf of said employes. The plaintiff informed the union officials that
it did not believe that the union had a majority of the
said employes, and declined to bargain with said union
until such· majority was satisfactorily established. On
July 27, 1940, a strike was called of certain of said
employes. On July 30, 1940, an informal meeting was
held with Commissioner William M. Knerr presiding as
a conciliator, Mr. Knerr having been c~lled in as such
conciliator by the union officials, and the company rep!~sentatives having voluntarily attended said meeting.
On July 31, 1940, after having allegedly checked
the payroll of the said company a:gainst a list of names
subm~tted. by the union, and allegedly interviewing some
of the alleged union applicants, and upon that basis,
the said defendant, as the Utah Labor Relations Board,
2
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certified the United Industrial Local Union as the appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining
for the employes of the plaintiff company employed in
the shipping, servicing, delivery, and general warehouse
work.
A subsequent meeting . called by Commissioner
Knerr, as conciliator, was attended voluntarily by the
plaintiff and representatives of the union, on August 2,
1940, in an attempt to conciliate and mediate the controversy between the employer and the union. and, if
possible, as stated by the defendant Board, for the purpose of having the men return to work.
On August 1, 1940, the plaintiff filed a formal protest to the said certification of the defendant, and requested an appropriate hearing upon due notice, and
further requested that the defendant Board arrange for
a secret ballot of the said employes, for the purpose
of determining the appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes, and whether or not said union did,
in fact, represent a majority of the employes in the appropriate bargaining unit. In the said protest, the plaintiff, in substance, alleged that the said union did not
truly represent a majority of plaintiff's employes nor
a majority of the employes in the classification mentioned; the plaintiff further alleged that the sales and
office employes should be classified together with the
employes mentioned, in one unit, for collective bargaining; the plaintiff further alleged that the certification
of the defendant Board was based upon inadequate and
incomplete investigation, which failed to establish that

3
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the said-' union :represented a majority of the ·said employes of plaintiff at the time the said protest was filed;
plaintiff further objected that the said certification was
not made .after an appropriate hearing upon due notice,
and that no secret ballot was taken as a basis ,for said
certification, and that such investigation and certification was made while part of said employes were out on
strike, and under conditions which made it difficult, if
not impossible, to determine whether or not all the said
employes were still in the employ of the plaintiff company.
On August 2, 1940, Commissioner Knerr transmitted to the plaintiff a communication from the union
officials, in ·which the said union consented to the conducting of a secret ballot among the employes of the
unit theretofore designated by the Board as the appropriate unit for collective bargaining. On August 3, 1940,
the plaintiff replied in substance to Commissioner Knerr,
consenting to a secret ballot, on condition that no charges
of alleged unfair labor practices, up to the time of said
ballot, be filed or considered, and that all the said company's employes, save for managers, assistant managers,
and supervisors, be classified together and allowed to
cast their ballot.
On August 7, 1940, the Industrial Commission
adopted a resolution calling a hearing for August 9,
1940, at the hour of 10 :00 o'clock A.M., for the purpose
of determining the question of representation for collective bargaining in the said matter. A copy of the said
resolution was served upon the plaintiff on August 7,
4
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1940. At the outs.et of the said hearing, the· plaintiff
objected to the sufficiency of notiee of the said hearing,
and called the attention of the defendant Board to the
fact that the notice of one day did not constitute due
notice within the meaning of the statute. The Board,
.
nevertheless, proceeded with the said hearing, as scheduled, and on the 16th day of August, 1940, rendered its
decision and made its order, in substance and effect that
the said union, as of July 26, 1940, had a majority of the
employes in the department theretofore designated by
the Board as the appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes, and denying a secret ballot among the
said employes, and ordering and directing the plaintiff,
without further delay, to enter into negotions for the
purpose of collective bargaining with the said local
union, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. The said
decision and order was made and entered upon the
affirmative vote of Commissioner Knerr and McShane,
Commissioner Jugler voting in the negative. Commissioner J ugler further filed a dissenting opinion, in
substance and effect holding that all the employes named
on the list furnished by the plaintiff company should
be classified together as one unit for collective bargaining purposes, and that a secret ballot should be conducted of the said employes, for the purpose of determining whether or not the said union had a majority.
'

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
As stated in plaintiff's petition for review, plaintiff
contends that the said decision and order of the defen5
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dant Board is without legal right and ·contrary to law,
and the ·plaintiff is aggrieved thereby for the following
reasons, to-wit :
1. That the notice of one day, given the plaintiff
of the said hearing of August 9, 1940, did not constitute
due or legal notice, and was not sufficient or reasonable
notice ''to enable the plaintiff and others interested in the
said hearing adequately and properly to prepare and
present to the Board evidence pertaining to the issues
to be presented at the said hearing.
2. That at the said hearing of August 9, 1940, the
said Board entirely failed and refused to take any evidence or seek any information to enable it adequately
to determine the proper representative of the employes
of the plaintiff company for collective bargaining purposes.
3. That the said decision of said Board, designating ·and classifying certain employes as the proper unit
for collective bargaining purposes, was made without
adequate inquiry or consideration, was directly contrary
to the expressed written wishes of 67 per cent of the
employes of the plaintiff company, and was made solely
for the reason and upon the ground that the said union
requested such classification.
4. That the said decision of the said Board, denying a secret ballot of the employes of the said company, was contrary to law, and was made in the face
of the express consent of the said union that such an
election be had, on condition that it be confined to the
6
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employes of the unit, as classified by the Board in its
decision of August 16, 1940, as aforesaid, and was made
in disregard of all the facts and circumstances and
evidence presented· to· ·the Board to the effect that a
fair _and just determination as to the said representation could not be h~~d. in any other way than by a secret
ballot.
5. That the said decision of the defendant Board
was made solely on the basis of alleged applications for
membership in the said union, previously presented to
the said Board by the said union, and without any check
or evidence as to whether the persons who allegedly
signed the said applications in fact desired the said union
to represent them at the time of the said decision of
the Board on August 16, 1940.
6. That the said decision of the said Board was
made while some of the said employes affected by the
said decision were out on strike from the said company,
and while informal charges of alleged unfair labor practices filed by the said union against this plaintiff were
pending and undetermined, and upon which charges
this plaintiff had not and has not yet been afforded
any hearing whatever.
ARGUMENT
We shall discuss the questions for review in the same
order presented in our petition for review.
I. THE NOTICE OF ONE DAY OF THE·
SAID HEARING OF THE BOARD OF AUGUST 9, 1940, DID NOT CONSTITUTE DUE
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·OR LEGAL NOTICE, AND WAS NOT SUFFICIENT OR REASONABLE NOTICE OF THE
SAID HEARING.
Chapter 55, Section 10, Sub-section c, Laws of Utah,
1937, reads as follows:
''Questions affecting intrastate commerce:
Whenever a question affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of industry arises
concerning the representation of employees, the
board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names
of the representatives that have been designated
or· selected. In any such investigation, the board
shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon
due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under section 11 or otherwise, and may take
a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other
suitable method to ascertain such representatives."
·
It will be noted ~hat this section requires that the
Board shall "provide for an appropriate hearing upon
due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under
section 11 or otherwise.'' We grant that the hearing
in question was not called in conjunction with a proceeding under section 11, which section has to do with
hearings upon charges of unfair labor practices, but
we respectfully call attention to the fact that, under
the said section 11, the Legislature provided that not
less than five days' notice must be given of any hearing
under the said section. There is no express number of
days of notice provided in the statute for any hearing
other than hearings under such section 11 ; the only
require~ent is that the said hearing be ''upon due notice." We call attention, however, to the fact that the
8
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matter of determining the appropriate. unit and the representatiYe thereof for colle-ctive bargaining purposes,
is at least as vital and important as the matter of adjudicating an alleged unfair labor practice, and that, in
all fairness, at least as much notice should be given of
such hearing as of one· called for the purpose of adju:..
dicating the charge of unfair labor practice. The hearing of August 9, 1940, was the first formal hearing
called by the defendant Board for that purpose, and it
appears that the action of the Board in providing only
one day's notice for said hearing, was made in utter
disregard of the vital importance of the question to be
determined, and of the necessity for a complete and
thorough investigation of the facts of the matter.
We have been able to find but one case bearing
directly upon the question of the sufficiency of notice of
hearing under the National Act. That is the case of Lane
Cotton Mills, 1938, 9 N.L.R.B. 952. In that case, the company was served with an amended complaint and notice
of hearing on October 16, 1937, after business hours,
and hearing was held on October 18, 1937. The trial examiner denied the company's motion for postponement,
and the Board over-ruled the examiner, stating as follows:
''Although the respondent participated in the
hearing, because of lack of notice, full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to produce evidence bearing upon
the issues of the amended complaint, was not at
the time afforded to it.''
It should be noted further that, under the National
Act, at least five days' notice is provided for the hearing

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of charges of alleged unfair labor practices, and that the
N.L.R.B. formerly issued regulations requiring five
days' notice but that the existing rules and regulations
of N.L.R.B., Section 202.5, series 2, provides that the
date fixed for the hearing shall not be less than ten days
after the service of the complaint.
The action of the defendan~ Board, therefore, in
affording only one day's notice in the instant case would
seem to be entirely unwarranted.
II. AT THE SAID HEARING, THE
BOARD FAILED TO TAKE ANY EVIDENCE
OR TO SEEK ANY INFORMATION TO ENABLE IT ADEQUATELY TO DETERMINE
THE PROPER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
EMPLOYES FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PURPOSES.
A search of the transcript of the testimony taken
at the said hearing reveals only testimony and evidence
pertaining to the classification of the employes as a
unit for collective bargaining purposes, with the exception of the petition signed by thirty out of a tota~
of forty-five employes in the company, requesting the
right to vote on any unionization of.the employes, which
petition is referred to on page 4 of the transcript, and
which is also made a part of the record, and, with the
fu;rther exception of Mr. Andrews' testimony on page 5
and on pages 78, 79, and 80, and Mr. Sorensen's testimony on page 41, as follows:
'' Q. You have also expressed a desire,
through your representative here to the Commission, that you feel that a secret ballot would be
the only way of determing the desire of your em-

10
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ployees as to the bargaining agency. Will you
explain that 1
''A. I sincerely feel that a secret ballot is
necessary. I have been informed and believe that
considerable pressure has been brought on our
employees by some of the union representatives,
and the employees of our store can expres.s their
free opinions only by a secret ballot, so that we
won't feel they are being influenced.
'' Q. You believe under the condition that
has been reported to you that is the only proper
way to determine this issue 1

''A. Yes, I think that is the only proper
way.''
It will be noted that the Board did not, at any time
at the hearing or in conjunction therewith, make any
inquiry or investigation whatsoever with respect to the
question of whether or not the said union represented
a majority of the employes, either in the unit designated by the Board as the proper bargaining unit, or
in the company as a whole, either at the time of- its
decision or at any prior time. In other words, the Board
went through the formalities of a hearing, because the
law required such a hearing, but did not seek nor receive any evidence whatsoever on the vital question
of whether or not the said union represented a majority
of the employes; the Board evidently chose to disregard
entirely the statement of Mr. Sorensen as set forth on
page 41 of the transcript and the statements of Mr.
Andrews, as aforesaid, and rested its decision as to the
existence of a majority of the employes in the union upon
the prior action of the Board, which certified the union as
the collective bargaining agent, as of July 26, 1940, solely
11
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on the basis of a comparison of union applications with
a list of employes of the company. In this respect,
it appears that the Board, at the said hearing, entirely
closed its eyes and its mind to the vital question of the
existence of a union majority, and merely rested upon
its prior certification, which was made without hearing,
without notice, and without adequate investigation.

III. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD
DESIGNATING CERTAIN EMPLOYES AS
THE PROPER UNIT FOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PURPOSES , WAS MADE
WITHOUT ADEQUATE INQUIRY OR CONSIDERATION, AND WAS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS WRITTEN
WISHES OF 67 PER CENT OF THE EMPLOYES.
At the said hearing, the Board was faced with two
requests : first, a request from the local union that the
employ~s in the shipping, servicing, delivery, and general warehouse work of the company be designated as
the proper unit for collective bargaining purposes; and,
second, a request voluntarily submitted and filed by
the employes themselves, acting through one of their
number, Mr. Thos. K. Andrews, signed by thirty out of
forty-five employes in the entire company, asking that
all t-he said employes have a right to vote on any unionization of the employes of the company. The Board saw
fit after the said hearing, to deny and disregard the
request of the said thirty employes, and to grant the
request of the union, and. classified the employes in accordance with the union's request and contrary to the
wishe·s of the said thirty employes, many of whom were
among those who had allegedly signed union applica-

12
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tions: It· would appear that such action ·of the· Board,
in choosing to follo'v implicitly the ·demands of·the union
in preference to the express written ·request of the employes themselves, does violence to the ·very spirit and
essence of the Utah Labor Relations Act, in that it exalts
the union above the employes, and curbs the ''full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their (the employes) own choosing,'' as set forth in the said law, and subordinates the
will of the employes to that of the union.
While it is admitted that the plaintiff, through Mr.
H. A. Sorensen, expressed its belief that it would be to
the best interest of the employes, and in the interest.
of harmony in the company that all the employes be
classified in one unit, and that dissention would ensue
if such classification were not made (Tr. 37), the employer made such observation in sincerity and with the
firm conviction that the action recommended by the
employer would bring about harmony and good will in
his establishment. The request for classification of all
the employes in one unit sprang volu!ltarily from the
employes themselves; and their representative, Mr. An~
drews, was interrogated severely a.nd at length by Commissioner Knerr, for the purpose of eliciting some evidence of influence or coercion on the part of the employer, in the instigation of the said request, but the
said interrogation of the said Mr. Andrews brought out
emphatically the fact that the said request was wholly
voluntary on the part of the said thirty employes (Tr.
78-81).

13
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Whil~

admitting the soundness generally of the pol..
iey of protecting employes against coerc.ive influences
on the part of the employer, and the consequent possible
need for the protective measures afforded by law in be ..
half of unions, as against employers, we fail to see where,
by all rules of reason alid justice, there is any justifica..
tion for a labor board to close its eyes completely to the
expressed wishes of 67 per cent of the e·mployes of a
c.ompany, a.nd_ to follow blindly the demands of a union,
in conflict with the said employes' request, particularly
where the· employer is not involved in the said controversy beyond expressing its wish and desire that the
request of the employes be followed, in the inte-rest of
harmony and peace.
In connection with the classification ordered by the
Board we respectfully call attention to the fact that the
union representative, in the first instance, claimed that
"nowhere throughout the United States has the Congress
for Industrial Organization ever admitted to its membership or claimed jurisdiction over the employes herein
exempted. '' (From letter of August 5, 1940, to Utah Labor Relations Board, signed Frank Bonacci). At the
hearing, Mr. Bonacci stated, in substance, that he did not
claim jurisdiction over the employes _exempted as aforesaid (Tr. 9), but stated that in several small stores and
restaurants, cashiers are sometime taken into the union
(Tr. 13). Mr. Bonacci further stated, in substance, that
he did not take in the employes excepted, because he did
not want them in the union (Tr. 17), and stated further
that there is nothing to prevent the C.I.O. from organizing said employes ( Tr. 21).
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Mr. Varro C. Jones, organizer for C.I.O., ·called to
testify by Commissioner Knerr, testified in substance
that, if the thirty men in question, employes of the South
East Furniture Company, had made application for one
charter for their group, such charter would have been·
granted by the C.I.O. (Tr. 65-66), and that the men
themselves determine the classification the group shall
be in (Tr. 64).
Furthermore, the documents submitted by the plaintiff company at the said hearing (marked Exhibits A,
B, C, D, E, F, G, and H), we believe, constitute evidence
that the C.I.O. does frequently include in one unit employes in shipping, servicing, delivery, warehouse,
clerical, and sales departments of a company. Despite
the evidence submitted to that effect, the Board. erroneously, we think, chose to follow the demands of the
union and to classify the bargaining unit in accordance
with such demands.
The Board's power to define the approprite unit
for purposes of collective bargaining is set forth in Subse·ction b of Section 10, Chapter 55, Laws of Utah, 1937,
as follows:
''Appropriate unit.
The board shall decide in each case whether,
in order to insure to employees the full benefit of
their right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
thereof."
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The above quoted sub-section was copied word for
word from Sub--section b of Section 9 of the National
Labor Relations Act. Therefore, it would seem that the
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board pertaining to this subsection, should be a safe guide for this
court to follow.
We quote from the Third Annual Report, N.L.R.B.,
1938 and Fourth Annual Report N.L.R.B., 1939, page
83, as follows :
"Self-organization among employees is generally grounded in a community of interest in their
occupations, and more particularly in their qualifications, experience, duties, wages, hours, and
other working conditions. This community of interest may lead to organization along craft lines,
along industrial lines, or in any of a number of
other forms representing adaptations to special
circumstances. The complexity of modern industry, transportation, and communication, and the
numerous and diverse forms which self-organization among employees can take and has taken,
preclude the application of rigid rules to the determination of the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
''In attempting to ascertain the groups
among which there is that mutual interest in the
objects of collective bargaining which must exist
in an appropriate unit, the Board takes into consideration the facts and circumstances existing
in each case. The nature of the work done by the
employees involved, their training and the extent
of their responsibilities, and the organization of
the employer's business are all entitled to weight.
In evaluating these factors, the Board must also
consider the history of collective bargaining,
whether successful or otherwise, among the employees involved as well as among other employees
in the same industry or in similar industries.
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Finally the- Board ·m.ust evaluate various other
factors 'Yhich tend to show the presence or absence of a mutual interest in collective bargaining bet~een var~ous gro~ps .of employees.
''The precise weight to be given to any of
the releYant factors. cannot be mathematically
stated. Generally several considerations enter
into each decision.'' (Third Annual Report,
NLRB, 1938 (page 157).
''The Board must determine frequently
whether the unit or units shall be industrial, inchiding practically all the employees in the plant,
semi-industrial; including a. majority of the employees, multicra.ft, including several groups of
skilled· ·workers, craft, including one group of
skilled workers, or some otper unit, including only
part of the employees.'' (Fourth Annual Report,
NLRB, 1939 (page 83).
As to centralization of management, an employe
unit was held appropriate because of a central employment office,
interchange
of employes; . one superinten.
.
dent, and a central handling of grievance problems.

Aluminum Co. of America, (1938) 6 NLRB 444.
Similarly, the matter of central management resulted in
a designation of one unit in the following cases:

United Shipya'rds, Inc., (1938) 5 NLRB 742
Standard Oil Company of Calif., (1938) 5 NLRB
750
.
Waggoner Refining Co., Inc., (1938) 6 NLRB 731
Stackpole Carbon Co., (1938) 6 NLRB 171
Paraga Rubber Co., (1938) 6 NLRB 23
The .Amerir;a~n Brass Co., (1938) 6 NLRB 723
American Hardware Corp., (1937) 4 NLRB 412
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Kling Factories, (1938) 8 NLRB 1228
The Borg Paper Co., (1938) 8 NLRB 657
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., (1938) 8
NLRB 508
As to community of interest, we quote from the
.Third Annual Report of N.L.R.B., 1938, page 174, as
follows:
''Under the .terms of the Act, the Board, in
determining the appropriate unit, attempts to
insure to employees the full benefit of the right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining. The
chief object of the Board, therefore, is to join in
a single unit only such employees and all such employees, as have a mutual interest in the objects
of collective bargaining. The appropriate unit
selected must operate for the mutual benefit of
all the employees included therein. To express
it another way, the Board must consider whether
there is that community of interest among the
employees which is likely to further harmonious
organizations and facilitate collective bargaining.''
Some of the N.L.R.B. decisions grouping together
those employes having common economic interests are
the foil owing :

International Mercantile Mar~ne Co., (1936) 1
NLRB 384
Tennessee Copper Compam,y (1938) 5 NLRB 768
Th.e Texas Co., (1939) 11 NLRB 925
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (1939) 15 NLRB 515
(Where employees of several plants were
grouped together as one unit because the interests of such employes were interwoven,
and the collective bargaining for all the plants

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

involved, in the opinion of the Board, could
most effectively be achieved through the e~s
tablishment of a single bargaining unit.)
Fisher Body Corp., (1938) 7 NLRB 1083

The Calco Chemical Co., Inc., {1939) 13 NLRB 34
Nekoosa-Edw·ards Paper Co., {1939) 11 NLRB
446
Terminal Flour Mills Co., (1938) 8 NLRB 381
The Osgood Co., (1937) 4 NLRB 312
As to the desire of the employes, we quote in part
from the Third Annual Report of N.L.R.B., 1938, beginning on page 167, as follows:
"The Board has given great weight to the
desires of employees as expressed by their forms
of self-organization; and it has also considered
whether certain groups of employees have expressed a will to be included or excluded from a
particular unit, in determining the bounds of that
•t "
urn.
Accordingly, in the case of The Globe Machine am,d
Stamping Co., {1937) 3 NLRB 294, where three unions
advocated a division of the employes into three units,
and a fourth union contended for a single unit for all
employes, the Board stated in part as follows :
''In such a case wher9' the considerations are
so evenly balanced, the determining factor is the
desire of the men themselves. On this point, the
record affords no help ... The only documentary
proof is completely contradictory. We will therefore order elections to be held separately for the
men engaged in polishing and those engaged in
punch press work. We will also order an election
for the mployees of the company engaged in production and maintenance, exclusive of the pol-

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ishers and punch press workers and of clerical
and supervisory employees . . . ''
To similar effect is the Commonwealth Division of
Ge'fberal Steel Castings Corporation, (1937) 3 NLRB 779.
As tq past experience of workers in the plant 'with
respect to collective bargaining units, it is evident that
in ·the instant case, there is no previous experience upon
which to base a determination.
With reference to the matter of functional coherence
and interdependence of the ·various . departments and
employes, we quote from the Third -Annual Report of
_N.L.R.B., 1938, p~ges 191-192, as follows:
''Hence the Board has held that a close interrelation of the work of various departments of a
plant tends to support a finding of one plant unit,
rather than departmental units, and also militates
against the splitting off of one department from
a plant unit. Similarly, the fact that two plants
owned by a company cooperate in the manufacture of some of the company's products supports
a finding of one unit for the employe·es at both
plants.''
As to interchange of employes, it has been generally held by the Board that employes whose duties are so
_nearly alike that they can be transferred throughout
the departments of one plant, or from plant to plant,
have a common viewpoint as to working conditions and
should, therefore, be classified as one unit.· To this effect, see the following cases :

Paper, Calmenson & Co., (1938) 10 NLRB 228
Postal Telegraph-Cable Corp., (1938) 9 NLRB
1060
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Lenox Shoe Co., (1937) 4 NLRB 372
Bingham & Taylor Corp., (1937) 4 NLRB 341
Federated Fishing Boats of New England (1939)
15 NLRB 1080.
With reference to the interdependence of o~erations
of the employes, it has been generally held that where
the departmental operations of a plant are so highly
interdependent that the stoppage of work in any department necessitates a stoppage of the work in the remaining departments, the contention is usually supported
that a plant unit is the most appropriate. To this effect,
see the following cases :

Hamilton Realty Corp., (1938) 10 NLRB 858
Postal Telegraph-Cable Corp., (1938) 9 NLRB
1060
Daily Mirror, Inc., (1938) 5 NLRB 362
(In which the Board stated in part as follows:
''The functional interdependence of the various departments of the company and the
greater effectiveness of the larger unit for
collective bargaining make the employer unit
appropriate.'')
National Distillers Products Co., (1938) 5 NLRB
862.
With reference to the lack of representation of particular employes excluded, it has generally been held
by the Board that where the petitioning union desires
the exclusion of a group of employes from a bargaining
unit, and the Board finds that there is no bona fide
union in the plant to which these employes are eligible,
the Board usually includes them in the unit, so as not
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to deprive them of the right to bargain collectively. To
this effect, see the following cases :

Cupples Co., (1938} 10 NLRB 168
(Where the union organized the match department only, and the employer contended
that an industrial unit embracing all employes was proper, the employer's contention
was· upheld by the Board, on the grounds
that the employes who were not organized
should not be denied the benefits of the act.)
Harter Corp., (1938) 8 NLRB 391
(Where the Board included maintenance
men and engineers in a plant unit contrary
to the wishes of the union.)
Times Publishing Co., (1938) 8 NLRB 1170
(Where the Board, contrary to the wishes of
the union, included six composing room employes who were denied membership· in the
union because of their brief apprenticeship.)
Selby Shoe Co., (1939) 15 NLRB 489
(Where four pressfeeder girls excluded from
the craft union were placed in the major unit
by the Board, contrary to the wishes of the
union.)
As to the effect of alleged eligibility to membership
in the union, we quotH from the Third Annual Report
of N. L. R. B., 1938, pages 166-167, as follows .

'' * *
it is clear that the Board cannot
be bound in determining the appropriate unit by
the rules established by the labor organizations in
the field. Those rules constitute only one of the
factors which the Board considers in making its
decision.''
IV. IN DENYING A SECRET BALLOT
IN THE FACE OF THE EXPRESSED CON-
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SENT OF THE UNION THAT SU·CH BALLOT
BE CONDUCTED, AND IN DISREGARD OF
ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES,
THE BOARD ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW,
AND ITS SAID ACT CONSTITUTED A
BREACH OF DISCRETION.
We call attention to the offer of the union (con~
tained in the letter from A. M. Peterson to Chairma~
W. M. Knerr, dated August 2, 1940) to consent to a
secret ballot among the employes in the unit d~signated
by the Board. In respect to that offer, the employ~·~
agreed to stipulate in accordance therewith, on condition
that the .clerical and sales employe·s be included in the
said unit and be allowed to ballot. The hearing in ques ..
tion was thereafter called, and, in the course of the
hearing, Commissioner Knerr, who. presided at the said
hearing, stated in part as follows :
''If we hold an election and the Commission
defines the unit, we may define all the employees
or take Mr. Bonacci's version of it, we don't
know. If we define the unit then the employer
will be authorized to have a representative at the
ballot box and the employees will designate a
representative, and those representatives ought
to be familiar with the activities of every employee so they can intelligently challenge any
ballot that may be cast. So if we have an election we ought· to be in a position to do that.''
(Tr. 35)
At the same hearing, Commissioner Knerr further
stated as follows :
"As a matter of fact, the union has consented to a secret ballot, with the understanding
that the appropriate unit be determined. So the
only issue is as to whether or not the proper
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unit has been determined~ As I understand it,
the union ·has said they would submit to a secret
ballot provided the Commission would define
the proper employees to belong to the union, but
they challenge, or they ask the Commission not
to include all the employees that the employer
wants.'' (Tr. 41)
Without further comment from the Board or any
of its members, the next notice that the plaintiff received
was the decision of the said Board of August 16, 1940,
wherein a secret ballot was denied and the employer was
ordered to bargain with the union.
· At the said hearing, there were two general questions before the Board for determination, namely:
First, what is the appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes~ and
Second, does the union hold a majority of
the employes in the said unit~
After determining that the appropriate unit was 1n
accordance with the prior designation of the Board, in
the light of the consent of the union theretofore given
and the statement of the Chairman of the Board, indicating that an election would be held after the determination of the appropriate unit, it would appear that the
subsequent action of the Board in denying a secret ballot
was entirely unwarranted and unjustified.
·. Sub~section c, Se·ction 10, Chapter 55, Laws of Utah,
1937, governs the method of ascertaining who the representative of employes is in such cases. This section
was copied, word for word, from Section 9 (c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, save for the fact that the
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said section of our state law was. made to apply to
intrastate commerce. This honorable Court has not
passed upon the question at bar, and the, decisions of
the federal courts on the National Act are indeed
meagre. We must, therefore, turn principally to thedecisions of the N. L. R. B. for light as to the interpretation of this section. First, however, let us turn
to the expressions of the intention of our national Legislature in enacting National Labor Relations Act.
The United States House of Representatives Labor
Committee made a report dated June 10, 1935 (Report
1147), which reads in part as follows:
''Section 9 (c) makes provision for elections
to be conducted by the Board or its agents or
agencies to ascertain the· representatives of employees. The question will ordinarily arise as
between two or more bona fide organizations
competing to represent the employees, but the
authority granted here is broad enough to take
in the not infrequent case where only one such
organized group is pressing for recognition, and
its claim of representation is challenged. It is,
of course, contemplated that pursuant to its
authority under section 6(a), the Board will
make and publish appropriate rules governing
the conduct of elections and determining who may
participate therein.
''The committee adheres, with the p.resent
National Labor Relations Board, to the common
belief that the device of an election in a democratic society has, among other virtues, that of
allaying strife, not provoking it. Obviously the
Board should not be required to wait until there
is a strike or immediate threat of strike. Where
there are contending factions of doubtful or wnknown strength, or the representation claims of
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the only organized group in the bargG!ining unit
are challenged, there exists that poten.tiality of
strife which the bill is designed to eliminate by
the establishment of this machinery for prompt,
governmentally supervised elections.'' (Italics
ours)
ThH N. L. R. B., on July 12, 1939, adopted a policy
which was even more liberal than the policy theretofore
prevailing with resl?ect to elections. On that day, in the
case of Cudahy Packing Company, 13, NLRB 526, anational union introduced in evidence 147 membership
cards, ·signed during the previous year by employes
within the appropriate unit of 157 persons, and also
presented petitions signed within two months preceding
the hearing by 141 of the said persons, but an independent union introduced petitions signed by 43 of thesaid employes, designating the independent union as
their representative. We quote the text of the decision
of N. L. R. B. in full as follows:
"The United claims that it should be certified upon the proof offered. The Company and
the Independent, however, assert that an election
must be held in order to ascertain the true wishes
of the employees. We are thus faced with conflicting claims as to which of the two labor organiaztions, each designated by a substantial number
of the employees involved, is entitled, under the
act, to represent all of them. Our determination
of representatives looks to the initiation of collective bargaining between the Company and its
employees. We believe that since each of two
contesting· labor organizations has proved substantial adherence among the employees, the bargaining relations which result will be more satisfactory from the beginning if the doubt and disagreement of the parties regarding the wishes
of the employees is, as far as possible, eliminated.
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Although hi the past we have certified .represen.tatives zoithout an election upon a showing of the
sort here made, u;e are persuaded by our experience that the policies of the act will best be
effectuated if the question of representation which
has arisen is resolt·ed in an election by secret ballot. We shall, accordingly, direct that such an
election be held.
·
''It should be noted that we are not here confronted with the necessity of deciding, upon the
testimony and documentary evidence in the record, whether on the date of a;n alleged refusal to
bargain, the Union represented a majority of the
employees in the appropriate unit. That question
could not be answered by an election, for the
result of a present election would not show the
Union's authority on the particular past date in
question. Were it necessary to decide in the present case whether the testimony and documentary
evidence in the record did or did' not establish a
majority for the Union, we would find that it
did. However, it is not necessary in this proceeding to make such a determination on the
present record. We are here co1~cerned with
establishing representatives for future barg·arim.ing purposes, a;n.d under the circumstances we
think that such future bargaining will best be
effectuated by holding a;n. election by secret
ballot." (Italics ours)
The best and customary method for resolving questions of representation under Section 9( c) of National
~abor Relations Act, has always been by means of elections conducted under the supervision of the Board.
In this manner, all doubt as to the desires of the employes concerning representation is dispelled. The following cases represent only a few of the vast number
of cases in which the Board has determined the ·bargaining representatives on the basis of an election:
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In the case of Armour & Company, 13 NLRB 1143,
decided July 12, 1939, the union produced evidence in
support of its claim of representation of a majority of
the employes. The company disputed the claim of the
union, but offered no evidence. The text of the Board's
decision follows :
''At the hearing, the Union offered evidence
in support of its claim that the majority of the
employees had designated it as their collective
bargaining agent. It requests certification upon
the proof offered. The Company, however, contests the Union's claims. It contends that an
election is necessary to determine the wishes of
the employees. Although in the past we have
certified representatives without an election upon
a showing of the sort made by this record, we are
persuaded by our experience that, under the circumstances of this case, any negotiations entered
into pursua;nt to a determination of representar
tives by the Board will be more satisfactory if
all disagreemen.t between the parties regarding
the wishes of the employees has been, as far as
p·ossible, eliminated. We shall therefore direct that
Ofl1t election by secret ballot be held.''
4 LRR
Man. 326. (Italics ours)
In the case -of Woodward Iron Compa;n.y, 13 NLRB
71, an election was directed although one union introduced in evidence authorization cards allegedly signed
by 402 employes within an appropriate unit of 584,
where a rival union challenged the validity of authorization card signatures and contended that the signatures, if genuine, were obtained by coercion.
In the case of Joe Lowe Corporation, 13 NLRB 76,
decided July 18, 1939, an election was directed, although
one union introduced documentary proof of present
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designation by a majority, where a rival union refusing
to reveal the names of its members reque~ted an election
A similar holding is found in the case of National Carbon
Company, Inc., 13 NLRB 100.
In the case of National Can Co., 13 NLRB 124, a
craft union presented proof of 54 signatures out of a
total of 95, signed and witnessed in the presence of the
union organizer, but the industrial union objected to
the use of the petition as the basis for certifying the
representative, and the Board ordered an election.
To the same effect is the case of S. Karpen & Bros.,
14 NLRB 36.
In the case of New York Handkerchief Compa;ny,
5 NLRB 703, decided as early as February 28, 1938, the
union claimed to represent a majority of the employes,
but the company denied the union's majority and refused
to negotiate. The Board ordered an election.
In re Gate City Cotton Mills, NLRB 57, decided
December 7, 1935, the union's claim to represent a
majority was denied by the employer, and the Board
ordered an election. In the case of American Tobacco
Company, 2 NLRB, decided September 1, 1936, an election was ordered where the employer refused to recognize the union claiming a majority of the employes
engaged in the department held to be an· appropriate
unit, on a finding that the union represented at least
a substantial number.
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In the case of In re International Nickel Company,
Inc., 1 NLRB 907, decided June 11, 1936, it was held
that a majority status dispute between union and employer regarding representation, together with employer's refusal to bargain with the union, constitutes the
basis for an election order. We quote a part of the
Boards' conclusion as follows:
''A question concerning the
of the employees in the plant has
created discontent, unrest and
tends to lead to labor disputes,
obstructing commerce, etc. ''

representation
arisen and has
bitterness and
burdening and

In the case of Atlantic Refining Company, 1 NLRB
359, decided March 19, 1936, the union presented 230
cards recently signed by employes, in a unit of 316. The
employer contended that many of the signatures were
obtained by coercion and compulsion, and the Board
ordered an election.
In the case of Associated Press, 1 NLRB 686, decided May 6, 1936, it was held that a dispute by the
employer of the union's claim to represent a majority of
the employes, and the employer's re.fusal to bargain
collectively with such union, and the unrest among employes, resulting therefrom, raises a question of representation, and is a sufficient basis for an election order
by the Board.
In the case of Burroughs Adding Machine Comparny,
(1939) 14 NLRB 829, the employer introduced letters
signed by a number of employes, renouncing their applications for membership in the union. The Board decided
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that the doubt created by the evidence could be resolved
best by an election to determine the bargaining representative. Similarly is the case of Superior Felt Otnd
Bedding Company, 14 NLRB 835.
Further evidence of the present policy of N. L. R. B.
to base its certifications on elections rather than on
proof of a majority status, adduced at the hearing, is
the case of Alpina Garment Company, (1939) 13 NLRB'
720.
In another case, decided in 1940, where the employer
did not question the majority status of the union, the
Board directed an election nevertheless, on the ground
that the evidence consisting only of testimony concerning the membership of the union was insufficient. 19
NLRB 51.
It is evident from the above decisions that from the
inception of National Labor Relations Act, it has been
the policy of N. L. R. B. to order an election, where
there was any reasonable doubt as to the majority claims
of the union, and that the Cudahy Packing , Company
case (1939) cited above, marked the beginning of even
a more liberal attitude on the part of the N. L. R. B.
with reference to elections. From that time on, N. L.
R. B. has steadfastly and consistently held to the position that the determination of the Board in cases such
as the one at bar, with respect to representation of the
employes, looks to the initiation of collective bargaining
between the company and its employes, and that the
bargaining relations which result will be satisfactory
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from the beginning, if the doubt and disagreement of
the parties regarding the wishes of the employes is, as
far as possible, eliminated, and that such -doubt and
disagreement can best be eliminated by the holding of
an election by secret ballot. Accordingly, since the
Cudahy Packing Company case, it appears that N. L.
R. B. has always ordered an election where doubt or
disagreement of the parties regarding the wishes of the
employes has been expressed. If such policy is good
for N. L. R. B., as applied to the interpretation of
the National Act, it most certainly should be the policy
of the defendant Board with respect to the interpretation of the state law, which was copied from and is identical with the National Act.
We further cite the case of N. L. R. B. vs. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corporation, decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States on February 27, 1939, and
reported in 306 U. S. 240, 83 L. Ed. 627. In this case,
there had been a lawful discharge of employes who had
participated in a sit-down strike, and new men had been
employed to replace them. Nevertheless, theN. L. R. B.
had ordered the employer to bargain collectively with
the union as the exclusive representative of the employes
in the unit in question. We quote from the decision of
th Court as follows :
''Respondent resumed work about March 12,
1937. The Board's order was made on March 14,
1938. In view of the change in the situation by
reason of the valid discharge of the sitdown
strikers and the filling of positions with new men,
we see no basis for a conclusion that after the
resumption of work Lodge 66 was the choice
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of a majority of respondent's employees for the
purpose of colective bargaining. The Board's
order properly requires respondent to desist from
interfering in any manner with its employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization and
to bargain collectively through representatives
of their O"'"n choosing. But it is a differen.t matter to require respondent to treat Lodge 66 in the
altered circumstances as such a representative.
If it is contended that Lodge 66 is the choice
of the employees, the Board has abunda;n.t a;uthority to settle the question by requiring an election.''
(Italics ours)
We further respectfully call attention to the fact
that the law in question defines no other method for
determini~g such rna tters, and that the ' 'secret ballot' '
is the only method mentioned in the statute. Where' dispute or disagreement exists, and where coercion, intimidation, and pressure upon the employes on the part of
either the union or the employer may exist, it is apparent that any method of determining the wishes of the
employes which relies upon the expression given by
the employes in the presence of any person, is inadequate and unsatisfactory in determining the employes'
wishes. In such cases, a secret ballot is the employe's
protection against such coercion, intimidation, and pressure from any source whatsoever. It can harm no one;
there can be no valid objection to it from any source;
it is the American way, the democratic way, of guaranteeing to the citizen his sacred franchise; and it is the
American way of guaranteeing to the employe his free
expression of preference as to his representative. There
can be no substitute for the secret ballot in such cases.
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We respectfully contend, therefore, that, in the light
of the employer's expressed opinion that the union has
brought considerable pressure upon the employes, and
that a free- expression of opinion can only be obtained
by a secret ballot, and in further light of the consent
of the union to the holding of a secret ballot, and in
view, further, of the petition signed by thirty out of a
total of forty-five e-mployes, as well as the memorandum
of Chairman W. M. Knerr, filed with the record to the
effect that ''subsequent to August 13, 1940, certain documents with reference to the- status of employes of the
South East Furniture Company have been filed with
the Commission,'; which documents the employer has
requested the Commission to certify to the Court, but
which the Commission has refused to do, there is ample
doubt and disagreement as to the wishes of the employe·s
in regard to representation, to justify an election, and
that the action of the Board in denying a se-cret ballot,
in view of all the circumstances, was an abuse of discretion; and that the cause should be remanded to the
Board with directions to conduct a secret ballot.
V. THE DECISION AND DETERMINA, TION OF THE BOARD WAS MADE SOLELY
ON THE BASIS OF ALLEGED UNION APPLICATIONS, AND WITHOU.T ANY EVIDENCE AS TO THE EMPLOYES' WISHES
AT THE TIME OF THE BOARD'S DECISION.
In the hearing of August 9, 1940, which was called
for the purpose of determining the appropriate unit and
the representative of the employes therein, the Board
failed and refused entirely to s.eek any evidence to determine the- wishes of the employes at that time. 'rhrough34
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out the entire proceeding, and in its decision, the Board
hearkened back to the date of July 26, 1940, and the
decision of the Board was made solely upon the basis
that the Board believed the union had a majority of the
employes, as of July 26, 1940, and, therefore, the Board
certified the union as the bargaining representative, as
of the date of its decision, August 16, 1940, without
attempting in any way to ascertain whether a change
of representation occurred in the interim.
It is our contention that if, at the said hearing, the
Board was called upon to determine whether an unfair
labor practice had been committed by the employer on
July 26, ·1940, in refusing to bargain with the union as
of that date, the Board should properly base its decision, in part at least, upon a determination of the union
representation as of July 26, 1940, but in the case at bar
the Board was called upon to determine the union representation as of the present time, and, therefore, in the
light of all the circumstances, it should have endeavored
to determine the wishes of the employes as of the date
of its decision. As was stated by the N. L. R. B. in the
Cudahy Packing Company case-, cited above, which case
is analagous in this respect, the Board was here concerned with establishing representatives for future bargaining purposes, and consequently, the Board should
have decided, as N. L. R. B. did in the Cu~ahy case, that,
under the circumstances, such future bargaining would
best be effected by holding an election by secret ballot.

VI. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD
WAS MADE WHILE A STRIKE WAS IN
PROGRESS AND WHILE INFORMAL
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CHARGES OF ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES, FILED B Y T H E U N I 0 N
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF WERE PENDING AND UNDETERMINED, AND UPON
WHICH THE PLAINTIFF HAD AS YET NO
OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD.
At the time the Board conducted its hearing, and
made its decision, a strike was in progress among some
of the employes of the unit in question. The very existence of such a strike is proof positive of disagreement
somewhere between the employes, the union, and the
employer. It is an outstanding evidence of strife, and
sometimes an indication of coercion or pressure somewhere along the line. Under these conditions, we submit
that the Labor Board fails to exercise its discretion
wisely or to promote the interests of harmony, good will,
and understanding between all the parties, when it
ruthlessly overrules the objections of the employer to
the claims of the union as to representation, and denies
the simple request made by the employer that a secret
ballot be conducted, and, without further ado, orders the
employer to bargain with the union on the basis merely
of an alleged comparison with union applications of a
list of the employes.
It will be noted further that the file contains evidence of informal.charges having been filed by the union
against the employer, alleging unfair labor practices.
For some reason, the defendant Board failed to call up
for hearing the said charges, and the said charges have
been pending since that time, without hearing. The very
existence of such informal charges is further evidence
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of strife a.nd contention between the union, the employes, and the employer, and constitutes a further reason and justification for the employer's request that
an election be held. Under these circumstances, it is
submitted that the Boards' refusal to heed the employers' request for an election was unjustified.
Respectfully submitted,

ROMNEY & NELSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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